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information theoretic security in accordance with channel and system parameters is derived. Security by complexity is assessed
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method are derived including generating robust joint constellations, decoding data with low complexity, and mitigating the eﬀects
of imperfections due to mobility, power control errors, and synchronization errors.
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1. Introduction
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is a
leading choice for many current and future air interfaces.
When using OFDM over a wireless channel the broadcast
nature of the channel exposes transmission to eavesdropping.
Securing communication links from eavesdropping is com-
monly done by implementing enciphering and deciphering
algorithms in software, and is usually detached from the
physical layer of communication. Prominent methods rely
on public keys cryptography such as RSA [1], or symmetric
cryptography with a common secret, such as the US
National Data Encryption Standard (DES) [2]. There are
some encryption methods which rely on the physical layer
of communication for their implementation, such as spread
spectrum Frequency Hopping (FH) and Direct Sequence (DS)
[3]. In FH and DS a key has to be generated and distributed
securely between the communicating parties. The key is used
to set the FH hopping pattern or DS spreading sequence.
Prominent key distribution methods rely on the Diﬃe-
Hellman algorithm [4]. Encryption, decryption, and key
distribution impose overheads on data throughput, energy
consumption, memory space, and computation power.
These overheads are a crucial implementation issue for
low complexity systems with strict constraints on system
resources [5], such as sensor and mobile networks [6–8].
Secrecy capacity analysis of random, noisy, and fading
channels showed that in theory, a communication link can
be perfectly secured from eavesdropping for certain limited
information rates [9–11]. Recent work provided specific
analysis of the secrecy capacity of wireless fading channels
[12–17]. Past work suggested practical methods for using
randomness in the wireless channel to alleviate the need for
key distribution. In [18–20], reciprocal channel estimation
of a slow fading wireless time varying channel was used as a
common secret to generate and distribute encryption keys
to be used by traditional encryption algorithms. In [21] a
diﬀerential frequency modulation technique coupled with
reverse piloting was used in a multitone channel to achieve
secure transmission for point-to-point systems. In [22] a
practical approach is depicted for key agreement in wireless
channels based on multilevel and Low Density Parity Check
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(LDPC) codes. In [18–22] the wireless channel was assumed
to be a reciprocal slow flat fading channel, which decorrelates
rapidly in space. The assumptions of reciprocity and space
decorrelation were well established in previous work [21]
and are adopted in this work as well.
It is common practice in wireless communications to
have the transmitter use asynchronous bursts of transmission
to access the channel. The burst starts with a prior known
pilot signal followed by modulated data symbols. The pilot
is used by the receiver to estimate the channel. The receiver
then uses the channel estimate to compensate for channel
attenuation and phase prior to decoding. Decoding of the
received data symbols is done based on the a prior known
signal constellation of the transmitter. Since the wireless
channel changes with time, a pilot signal has to be sent every
channel coherence time. An eavesdropper can use the pilot
signal to estimate the channel from the transmitter to itself
and decode the information in exactly the same manner as
the intended receiver. This means that sending a pilot signal
from the transmitter to the receiver compromises security.
In [23] the asynchronous burst transmission approach
was replaced with synchronous transmission to achieve
security. A reverse piloting protocol was proposed to secure
transmission bursts in a narrow-band single carrier point-
to-point system over slow flat fading channels. Synchronous
transmission allows for the pilot signal to be sent from
the receiver instead of the transmitter. The transmitter can
estimate the channel from the receiver to itself using the
receiver’s pilot signal and deduce the channel from itself to
the receiver based on channel reciprocity. The transmitter
can then send a burst of channel-compensated data symbols
over the same frequency as the pilot, and the receiver would
receive a readily decodable channel-compensated signal. The
receiver can use decision feedback to compensate for small
changes in the channel, so that its channel estimate remains
accurate until the original channel is fully decorrelated in
time. After the channel decorrelates in time the receiver
can send a new pilot signal. Since no pilot signal is sent
from the transmitter, the eavesdropper would be deprived
of estimating the channel from the transmitter to itself
prior to receiving the data symbols, and would be forced
to estimate the channel using blind estimation. Even for a
noiseless channel, no decoding of the data would be possible
until blind estimation is completed because the eavesdropper
will not be able to map the received symbols to decoded
bits. In this work, the reverse piloting protocol presented in
[23] is elaborated to support a plurality of transmitters in
a superposition modulation setting with joint decoding at
the receiver. It is shown that the elaborated protocol can be
practically used to obtain information theoretic security and
security by complexity with low implementation complexity,
no memory requirements and no overhead on throughput
and energy.
In contradistinction to previous work in literature, the
focus of this work is on facilitating channel overloading of
multiple transmitters over subcarriers in an OFDM system.
The purpose is to increase security strength and decoding
gain for transmitters in an OFDM system with limited
emission power, memory space, and online computation
power. Although we focus our attention on OFDM, our
analysis and results hold for securing narrowband single
carrier transmission as well. The novelty of this work is
in suggesting the use of reverse piloting for implementing
superposition modulation with joint decoding to achieve
information security. The main contributions are in two
categories: analysis of security strength of the proposed
method and practical implementation of the proposed
method. The analysis of security strength results in a
quantitative condition for achieving information theoretic
security, given a prior known channel and system param-
eters and assessment of security by complexity when the
condition is not satisfied. Practical implementation consid-
erations include generating robust signal constellations, low
complexity Maximum Likelihood (ML) decoding, network-
optimization, evaluation of the eﬀects of mobility, power
control errors and synchronization errors, and formulating
simple piloting rules for mitigating their eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
the method is presented using a multiple access protocol.
In Section 3 the mathematical model used for analysis
is defined. In Section 4 security strength is analyzed. In
Section 5 practical implementation is considered. Section 6
depicts an illustrative scenario of Rayleigh fading and three
transmitters, and Section 7 concludes the work.
2. ProposedMethod
In the proposed method the frequency and phase of subcarri-
ers from multiple transmitters are matched and synchronized
at the receiver. All transmitters transmit together and
their start of transmission is coordinated by the receiver
to have their signals reach the receiver simultaneously.
All transmitters use the same subcarrier frequencies. The
receiver is equipped with a single Matched Filter (MF)
matched to each subcarrier. Each transmitter is assigned
(oﬄine) a set of arbitrary Base Band (BB) symbols to
represent its information bits. Since the transmit-channel-
receive path is linear, the receiver’s MF output is a sum of
the BB symbols of all the transmitters, and represents the
transmitted bits of all the transmitters at once. This is in
fact superposition modulation of multiple transmitters on a
single subcarrier which is repeated individually for multiple
subcarriers. The BB symbol sets are computed oﬄine to have
all their possible summations create a signal constellation
with highest resistance to noise. The receiver decodes the
information bits of all the transmitters at once from a single
received symbol as if originating from a single transmitter.
Since the received signal constellation is jointly formed by
all the transmitters BB symbols, the proposed method is
herein termed Joint Constellation Multiple Access (JCMA).
A multiple access reverse piloting protocol over a single
subcarrier is given in what follows to implement the method.
(1) The receiver obtains knowledge on signal propaga-
tion time from each transmitter to itself through
some standard association procedure.
(2) The receiver assigns index and delay parameter to
each transmitter.
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(3) Each transmitter uses its index to access a preloaded
table for retrieving a BB symbol set.
(4) The receiver sends a pilot signal and starts sensing for
an incoming signal.
(5) Each transmitter individually estimates the reciprocal
channel’s phase and amplitude using the pilot signal
from the receiver.
(6) Each transmitter awaits its delay and sends a burst of
information symbols compensated for channel phase
and amplitude.
(7) The receiver receives a burst of joint information
symbols, which belong to its predefined joint signal
set.
(8) The receiver decodes all transmitters at once.
(9) The receiver uses decision feedback to compensate for
slow channel decorrelation in time.
(10) Steps 4–9 are repeated after a channel decorrelation
period has passed.
A preliminary simpler version of the proposed protocol
in this work was disclosed in [24], with the purpose of
enhancing decoding but no information security consider-
ations.
JCMA is superposition modulation with joint decoding.
It should be distinguished from the well-known Superpo-
sition Modulation with Successive Decoding (SM-SD) [25].
In SM-SD the transmitters transmit at the same time and
frequency and a joint signal is formed at the receiver.
Each transmitter’s symbol is treated as noise to the other
transmitters. The receiver decodes the information of each
transmitter individually in a successive manner. First, the
transmitter with the highest received signal energy is
decoded. The decoded bits are used as feedback to remove
the transmitter’s signal from the received joint signal. The
next transmitter with the highest received signal energy is
decoded and so on. In SM-SD the transmitters send pilot
signals to facilitate channel estimation at the receiver. As
explained before, this compromises security. In JCMA pilots
are sent only by the receiver. It follows that knowledge of the
channel is obtained only by the transmitters.
JCMA should also be distinguished from multiuser
detection [26] and rather recent advances in cooperative
transmit diversity [27]. In multiuser detection the structure
of the interfering signals from multiple transmitters is
used to reduce their eﬀect. The achievable coding gains
are considerable, but the use of multiple MFs is required
and the computational complexity grows exponentially with
the number of transmitters. In addition, no security is
gained. In cooperative transmit diversity, the transmitter
sends its own information while relaying the information of
another transmitter to the receiver. The method oﬀers some
performance gains, but the limited power of the relaying
transmitter has to be distributed between the data streams
of the participating nodes and no security is gained.
Beside SM-SD and multiuser detection, literature
presents other approaches to channel overloading of trans-
mitters over the same frequency band. For example, the
work in [28–30] uses symbol-synchronous superposition
modulation to create a joint rectangular lattice at the receiver
to support multiple transmitters using trellis codes. There
are also numerous works dealing with the adder-channel
for performing joint coding from multiple transmitters
through superimposed signals. In general, codebooks of
individual transmitters are optimized under some criterion
over the joint signal at the receiver—usually the focus is
on coding gain. More relevant to the focus of this work is
the work in [31, 32], where the joint minimal Euclidean
distance was used as the optimizing criterion of a symbol-
synchronous superimposed signal. A comprehensive review
of other channel overloading techniques is provided in [39].
The work in [25, 27–32] addresses the issue of designing
joint signal constellations to satisfy various optimization
criteria according to the problem explored. We are unaware
of previous work (including [25, 27–32]) using secure,
low complexity, joint symbol by symbol decoding as the
optimization criteria.
As would be apparent in the following sections, the
suggested method oﬀers a low complexity solution for
securing OFDM over the time-varying wireless channel. The
receiver uses a single MF and performs decoding of multiple
transmitters with the same complexity as decoding a single
transmitter. The transmitters’ complexity is the same as that
of a point-to-point scenario without security features. No
memory space, computation power, or transmitted energy
is required in order to secure transmission. For compari-
son, consider the analysis of energy consumption due to
implementing security algorithms performed in [5]. In [5],
it was shown that a typical sensor-node using asymmetric
key establishment coupled with symmetric encryption per
transmission session losses 20%–80% of its battery life due
to encryption, depending on the session length. See [5]
for energy consumption of RSA, DES, and DH in specific
systems. Other analysis provided in [8] considered the
Central Processing Unit (CPU), memory and transmission
overheads required for implementing standard security
algorithms implemented in specific oﬀ-the-shelf nodes. The
analysis in [8] concluded that DES is too resource demanding
to be used in a sensor network and that a minimum of
128 KB RAM and ability to tolerate a considerable delay in
data delivery are required to implement security algorithms
of lesser strength. See [8] for CPU processing and memory
and transmission overheads of encryption algorithms DES,
TEA, RC6, RC5, and SkipJack in specific systems.
3. Mathematical Model
In JCMA a joint constellation is constructed over each
subcarrier separately. It follows that most of the analysis
can be done using a model for a single subcarrier. In what
follows, a single subcarrier is considered. The expansion
of the analysis to an entire OFDM symbol is done when
evaluating security of the entire OFDM transmission.
The BB model of the multiple access scheme for a
single subcarrier is depicted in Figure 1, xi; i = 1, 2, . . . ,N
represent the transmitted complex BB symbols. Subcarriers
in OFDM experience flat fading. It follows that the channel


























Figure 1: Baseband model of JCMA.
over a single subcarrier is flat and is described by a single
complex number hi. The transmitted symbols are summed
via channel superposition and the MF output, without noise,
is given by y. Also, n is the BB additive white complex
Gaussian noise. The received signal r is fed to an ML decision
device, which decodes all the transmitted bits at once, as if
originating from a single transmitter (the so-called “super-
user” in [25]).
Let us define








where si is an information-carrying symbol with unit energy
which belongs to a predefined set Si. It is assumed that
1/αi is small enough to allow the transmitter to adjust its
power within its power constraint. If this is not the case,
communication would be severed, as would also happen in
a standard point to point scenario.
For now, it is assumed that βi,αi are known without
error at the ith transmitter-perfect Channel State Information
(CSI), and that hi remains constant during the decorrelation
time. In later sections, derivations to the model are defined to
analyze the eﬀects of imperfect CSI and mobility on system
performance.
From (1) and Figure 1 it follows that
r = y + n =
N∑
i=1
si + n. (2)
The joint signal constellation at the receiver is made up of all
the permutations in si, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N which generate y.
Note that Si; i = 1, . . . ,N are sets of complex numbers,
where Si = {si1, si2, . . . , si2M}. In addition, M is the number
of bits per symbol per transmitter, and y is a set of
complex numbers made of all possible summations of N
numbers, where each number belongs to a diﬀerent set Si.






i ∈ Sj where
{l1i , l2i , . . . , lNi } /={l1k , l2k , . . . , lNk } for all i /= k.
The symbol sets are determined oﬄine. For additive
Gaussian noise, the minimum Euclidian distance in the
joint constellation represented by y should be maximal
while constraining the average instantaneous energy over the
transmitter symbols to be less than P (peak power constraint
on transmitted power). Finding the best BB symbol sets is





{∣∣∣yi − yj∣∣∣}, (3)






∣∣∣Sij∣∣∣2 ≤ P; i = 1, . . . ,N. (4)
For additive Gaussian noise, ML detection translates to
finding the joint constellation symbol g in y which has the









To facilitate analysis, we assume that the eavesdropper uses a
single MF for decoding the data. At first glance, this seems to
be an unreasonable limitation on the eavesdropper resources.
The justification for this constraint would be given as part of
the discussion in this section.
In JCMA, the joint constellation at the receiver’s MF
output is the result of a coherent sum of the transmitter BB
symbols and is unique to the location of the transmitters
and receiver in space. This is achieved due to the individual
compensation of delay, phase, and attenuation of each
transmitter. The receiver’s joint constellation would always
be the same and the bit mapping from the transmitters to
the joint symbols would be known a prior to the receiver.
Since an eavesdropper would naturally occupy a diﬀerent
location in space, the transmitters BB symbols would create
a diﬀerent joint constellation than that of the receiver. This
is practically always true even when the eavesdropper is
close to the receiver because the wireless channel decorrelates
fast in space. A distance of a few carrier wavelengths apart
(a few centimeters for frequencies of the order of GHz)
decorrelates the channel almost completely [33]. It follows
that the eavesdropper would have no a prior knowledge of
the bit mapping from transmitters to joint symbols. This is
the basis for achieving information theoretic security.
The joint constellation is constructed optimally at the
receiver’s location in space. It follows that the joint constel-
lation at the eavesdropper location would have suboptimal
structure and would change after every reverse pilot sent
due to diﬀerent channel compensation performed at the
transmitters. In addition, the signals from the transmitters
would not reach the eavesdropper simultaneously. It follows
that even after discovering the bit mapping from transmitters
to joint symbols, the eavesdropper would have to decode the
information based on a deteriorated joint signal constellation
and the decoding complexity would be higher than that of
the receiver. This is the basis for security by complexity.
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[s1, s2, · · · sN ] ⇐⇒ y
M
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Figure 2: JCMA as a Shannon secrecy model.
For decoding data successfully the eavesdropper must
first perform blind channel estimation to map its received
joint constellation symbols to information bits. Finding the
bit mapping is an act of deciphering, where the received joint
symbols are the cipher-text, the channel coeﬃcients are the
encryption key and the information bits are the encrypted
message. After deciphering, the eavesdropper must decode
the data from a deteriorated signal.
4.1. Information Theoretic Security. We start by describing
the JCMA BB model as a Shannon secrecy model. Figure 2
depicts the secrecy model for an eavesdropper. The pilot
from the receiver invokes key generation and distribution
from the wireless medium to the transmitters. This key is
the channel estimates at the transmitters. Each part of the
key is known exclusively at each transmitter. In accordance
with the Shannon secrecy model and its notation in [34],
the message M as defined in [34] corresponds to the vector
of transmitted symbols across the transmitters. This joint
message is encrypted by the transmitters—each transmitter
transforms its symbol by scaling and rotating it with the key.
So K in [34] corresponds to the vector of channel estimates
at the transmitters. For the receiver’s location in space, the
channel itself performs a deciphering operation by rotating
and scaling the encrypted message back to the original y.
For the eavesdropper location in space the channel performs
another enciphering operation with another key K ′, being
the channels from the transmitters to the eavesdropper loca-
tion. The eavesdropper constellation point y′ corresponds to
the cryptogram E in [34]. The eavesdropper has to decipher
M from E using all possible prior knowledge, such as the
oﬄine-determined transmitters BB symbol sets, the channel
statistics, and the prior probabilities of the messages M.
A new key is generated every time a reverse pilot signal
is sent by the receiver. Due to the time varying nature of
the fading channel, a key uncorrelated with previous keys
is invoked after the channel decorrelates in time. This is
why the receiver is required to track the channel during the
decorrelation period. Note that encryption and decryption
are done automatically by the channel, so no overheads are
required for these operations.
The unicity distance was defined in [34] as the amount
of intercepted cryptograms by the eavesdropper beyond
which the eavesdropper can deduce the key. Equivalently, the
cryptogram is undecipherable when the message length is
less than the unicity distance [34]. So, to achieve information
theoretic security the message should be enciphered by a new
key before the eavesdropper gathers enough cryptograms
for deciphering. To secure an entire OFDM transmission
burst, the number of joint symbols within the channel
decorrelation period must be less than the unicity distance.
In the point-to-point narrow-band scenario (N = 1)
described in [23] a single channel took part in encrypting
a single message. It was shown that the channel acts as
a shift cipher for cases where the phase of the complex
Random Variable (RV) representing the channel is uniformly
distributed. Uniform distribution of phase is a common
assumption for describing wireless time-varying channels.
For the multipoint to point scenario we assume that the
phase of each channel is uniformly distributed over the
range [0, 2π). We derive the unicity distance for JCMA based
6 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
on this single assumption. For clarity of presentation we
consider the case where a single bit is transmitted by each
transmitter (M = 1). The derivation scales easily for general
M.
The received joint constellation at the eavesdropper is










Using amplitude-phase representation a single transmitter
symbol set is given by
Si =
{∣∣∣si1∣∣∣ exp( jθi1),∣∣∣si2∣∣∣ exp( jθi2)}. (7)
The structure of any signal constellation must be constrained
to achieve an output signal with zero mean, so that no power
is wasted. This means that the two signals in the constellation
are antipodal:
∣∣∣si1∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣si2∣∣∣ ≡ |si|; θi1 = θi2 + π. (8)
Using si = |si| exp( jθs), hi = |hi| exp( jθi), h′i = |h′i | exp( jθ′i ),













where ϕi = θs + θ′i − θi and δi = |si||h′i |/|hi|.
We find that s˜i originating from a single transmitter
arrives at the eavesdropper with the same amplitude δi for
either of the two possible bit values. The phase of s˜i is the
sum of three RVs. Two of the RVs (θi,θ′i ) are uniformly
and independently distributed over the range [0, 2π) and
the third (θs) assumes one of two possible values θi1, θ
i
2
corresponding to the two possible bit values.
Since the phase is uniformly distributed and cyclic over
[0, 2π), taking its colinear values (multiplying the RV with
−1) results in the same distribution. It follows that the
Probability Density Function (PDF) of θ′i − θi is equal to the

























, π ≤ z < 3π,
1
(2π)
− (z − 3π)
(4π2)
, 3π ≤ z < 5π,
0, otherwise.
(10)
















, 0 ≤ z < π,(
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, 0 ≤ z < 2π,
0, otherwise.
(11)
It follows that θ′i − θi is uniformly distributed over the
range [0, 2π). Adding θs to θ′i − θi results in a cyclic shift
of phase values over the range [0, 2π) but does not change
the PDF regardless the value of θs. It follows that ϕi is always
uniformly distributed over the range [0, 2π). This means that
the mappings from the two possible transmitter bit values to
a received symbol s˜i at the eavesdropper are equally probable.
Since the channel decorrelates fast across space, the
received individual symbols from the diﬀerent transmitters
at the eavesdropper s˜i, i = 1, . . . ,N are uncorrelated, each
received symbol from a transmitter has two equally probable
bit mappings. The result is 2N equally probable bit mappings
for the joint signal constellation at the eavesdropper. It
follows that JCMA is analogous to a substitution cipher with
2N equally probable keys.
The unicity distance of a substitution cipher is given by
[34]
Ud = H(K)1− η , (12)
where H(K) is the entropy of the key. Also, η is the eﬃciency
of the information source defined as η
def= 1 − D, where D is
the redundancy of the information source [34]. In our case,
H(K) = H(2N ) = N and the JCMA unicity distance is given
by
Ud = N1− η . (13)
The model in Figure 2 depicts a single subcarrier. Neigh-
boring subcarriers in OFDM experience similar channel
response due to channel correlation across bandwidth. This
means that neighboring subcarriers can be used by the
eavesdropper to discover their similar channel response
(encryption key). It is common to assume that the channel
decorrelates in frequency every coherence bandwidth (Bc).
To be on the safe side, it is assumed that all subcarriers
within Bc experience exactly the same channel. This is a strict
assumption, since subcarriers which are less than Bc apart are
not fully correlated.
Secrecy is required for the entire data transmission burst.
This means that the unicity distance must be larger than
the number of received joint symbols during the channel
decorrelation period (Lc) times the number of subcarriers
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within the channel coherence bandwidth (Nc). It follows
from (13) that for
NcLc ≤ N1− η , (14)
information theoretic security is achieved for the entire data
burst.






where Ts is the transmitted symbol time.
The channel temporal decorrelation time (Td), is gov-





where α is set to achieve suﬃcient channel decorrelation in
time. However, Bd is determined by the relative movement
of the transmitter with respect to the receiver described by
the Doppler shift, and by the movement of reflectors in
their path. Moreover, Bd increases with mobility and carrier
frequency. In the context of encryption strength a short
channel decorrelation time (higher mobility) is preferred.
This results in a higher key generating rate. In this sense, the
worse-case scenario is a stationary transmitter and receiver,
for which Bd has the smallest possible value.






If the system and channel parameters satisfy (17) the data
transmission burst is secured from eavesdropping.
If (17) is diﬃcult to satisfy due to small Bd, security
can be obtained by shortening the number of data symbols
in the transmission burst so that it equals the unicity
distance. This results in an equality in (14) regardless of the
channel decorrelation period. This approach would result
in throughput reduction as the transmitters must wait in
idle mode for the channel to decorrelate. Throughput loss
can be avoided by having multiple JCMA groups accessing
the channel in a TDMA fashion, so that one group uses
the channel while the others wait for it to decorrelate.
Alternatively, the protocol can be applied to only some of
the subcarriers preferably spaced apart as much as possible
across the bandwidth.
We now justify constraining the use of a single MF at
the eavesdropper. An MF is the optimal demodulator for
achieving a maximal SNR from the received signal [35].
Using multiple MFs connected to a signal antenna makes no
sense because the joint constellation is constructed over a
single complex dimension for any number of transmitters.
It follows that the optimal choice for the eavesdropper is
to use a single MF with soft decoding. If the eavesdropper
would try to use multiple antennas for finding the bit map-
ping faster (for decreasing the unicity distance), the result
would be multiple equivalent deciphering problems and the
eavesdropper would gain nothing as far as deciphering time
is concerned.
4.2. Security by Complexity. In the previous section, infor-
mation theoretic security of the entire data transmission
burst was found. Deciphering amounted to discovering the
bit mapping from the transmitters to each joint symbol.
Knowledge of the mapping is obtained by the eavesdropper
after the unicity distance has passed only if the eavesdropper
uses the best possible algorithm to decipher the data. After
deciphering is accomplished, the eavesdropper still has to
decode the data. When information theoretic security is
not achievable, security boils down to making decoding
much more diﬃcult for the eavesdropper compared to
the intended receiver. We identify four such security-by-
complexity features of JCMA.
(1) The eavesdropper would have diﬃculty to know
the expected joint symbol constellation at its MF
output, since it has no knowledge of the channel
compensation done at each transmitter, no immedi-
ate knowledge of the CSI from the nodes to itself, and
it receives noisy samples.
(2) The signals from the group nodes would not reach
the eavesdropper simultaneously, resulting in an
overlap of past and present symbols.
(3) The eavesdropper joint constellation would change
every decorrelation period. This is due to the chang-
ing of channel compensation at the transmitters. This
makes it impossible to design a constant and com-
putationally eﬃcient decoding algorithm, meaning
that the eavesdropper would have to perform an
exhaustive search for ML detection of every received
symbol. At the same time, the receiver decoding
algorithm would be constant because each channel
instance is compensated for.
(4) The joint constellation formed at the eavesdropper
MF output is not optimal for decoding, since it was
made to be optimal at a diﬀerent and unique location
in space—that of the receiver.
Due to Factor 1, the eavesdropper must first decide
on its joint signal constellation. This precedes deciphering
(mapping bits to joint symbols) and could prove to be a
diﬃcult task, since the joint samples are noisy and the joint
constellation changes with every new pilot from the receiver.
The deterioration of the signal at the eavesdropper due to
Factor 2 is substantial when the eavesdropper is far from the
receiver and is diﬃcult to evaluate as it depends greatly on
the multipath propagation of the transmitted signal. Factor
2 could be compromised when the eavesdropper is close
enough to the receiver.
Due to Factor 3, the asymptotic decoding complexity of
the eavesdropper is O(2N ), corresponding to an exhaustive
search over all possible constellation points. It would be
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shown in Section 5 that the asymptotic decoding complexity
of the receiver is O(N). The diﬀerence in complexity can
become substantial for small N as well. For example, for
N = 5 the receiver would be required to perform five simple
calculations per symbol, while the eavesdropper would have
to calculate and compare 32 Euclidean distances. Although
the decoding complexity of the eavesdropper is expected to
be high, it is prudent to assume that the eavesdropper might
have unlimited computational power, which would allow it
to perform ML detection using exhaustive search, so Factor
3 could be compromised.
Due to Factor 4, the eavesdropper has to perform
decoding using a suboptimal joint symbol constellation
and is expected to suﬀer a considerable penalty on Bit
Error Rate (BER) compared to the receiver. The exact
decoding loss depends on the number of transmitters, and
the characteristics of the channel which prevents a general
analysis. Evaluation of decoding loss for three transmitters
over a Rayleigh channel is given in Section 6.
The eavesdropper could use soft decoding and reception
using multiple antennas to achieve decoding gains. However,
at least some of the gains can be matched by the receiver. The
illustrative scenario provided in Section 6 demonstrates that
the required gain to match the receiver’s hard-decoding BER
is 20 dB for three transmitters in Rayleigh fading.
5. Practical Implementation
JCMA is based on superposition modulation with joint
decoding. Superposition modulation schemes require accu-
rate symbol synchronization and power control, and
are adversely aﬀected by mobility. These limitations are
commonly deemed prohibitive in practical applications.
Although superposition modulation is assumed in many
theoretical works, practical means of implementation are
usually not addressed, see [28–32], for examples.
To implement JCMA, robust joint signal constellations
and the transmitters’ symbols sets that construct them
must be found oﬄine. The joint constellations must not
result in performance loss. Eﬃcient low complexity joint
decoding must be formulated as well. The expected increased
sensitivity to synchronization and power control errors must
be mitigated without increasing implementation complexity.
These issues are addressed in what follows.
5.1. Joint Signal Constellations
5.1.1. Decoding Gain for Power Limited Transmitters. The
overall signal energy collected by the receiver’s MF in JCMA
grows with the number of transmitters. However, this does
not necessarily mean that performance would be enhanced.
The BER of ML detection in Gaussian noise is governed by
the Euclidean distance between points in the constellation
[35]. A key requirement for enhancing performance with
JCMA is that the increased energy per joint symbol translates
to an increase in the minimal Euclidean distance. In what
follows, a probabilistic approach is taken to prove that this






where the index N is introduced to denote that y was created
by N transmitters.






= 2−M , l = 1, 2, . . . , 2M. (19)
Let μn and σ2n denote the mean value and the variance of the
RV sn, respectively. It is assumed that the transmitters trans-
mit independent data and, therefore, {sn}Nn=1 are mutually
independent. ForN suﬃciently large, yN is a complex normal
RV with mean μN =
∑N





The following RV is defined
ΔN
def= y(1)N − y(2)N , (21)
where y(1)N and y
(2)
N are two received constellation points.
Since the probability for receiving one joint constellation
point is independent of the probability for receiving any
other constellation point, y(1)N and y
(2)
N are independent RVs.
Also, y(1)N and y
(2)
N are characterized by complex normal
distributions with mean μN and variance σ2N . Another RV is
defined as
ρN
def= |ΔN |2, (22)
where ρN has a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of






where ρN is the squared Euclidean distance between two ran-
domly chosen points from the joint constellation. It follows
that for Gaussian noise, ρN governs system performance as it
is directly related to BER.






) = 1− δ, (24)
where δ is a small positive number. However, (24) means
that the probability that the Euclidian distance between two
arbitrarily chosen points from the joint constellation would
be greater than dN is very close to 1.
















Introducing (24) to (25) yields
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From (20), it follows that σ2N+1 > σ
2




The minimum distance increases (in a probability sense)
as N increases. In other words, the increased energy reaching
the receiver is translated to increased distance between joint
constellation points at the receiver.
Now consider a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)
system with power limited transmitters and the same data
rate as a JCMA system. To maintain the same data rate
as that of the JCMA system, the constellation of each
transmitter would have to become more crowded as N
increases. Because the overall constellation power remains
constant, the minimal distance of the received constellation
would decrease and performance would deteriorate.
5.1.2. Suboptimal Symbol Search. To find the optimal joint
constellation, one must solve (3), (4) analytically. The goal
is to find BB symbol sets which maximize the minimal
Euclidean distance in the resulting joint symbol constel-
lation. This is an optimization problem with quadratic
constraint. While a closed form solution may be found
under limiting assumptions, this approach is avoided and
suboptimal search methods are used instead. This alternative
approach is justified because optimization is done only once
for a set of transmitters and is performed oﬄine, so there is
no need for a fast real-time solution.
For simplicity of presentation it is assumed that each
transmitter has two symbols in its symbol set, which means
that each transmitter has a single information bit represented
in the joint constellation (or chip when forward error
correction is employed). To make sure no transmission
power is wasted, each BB symbol set is made to be a rotated
and scaled version of Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK).
This insures that the mean value of each BB symbol set
and the mean value of the joint constellation are zero. The
derivations that follow are easily applicable to more than one
bit (chip) per symbol.
A random search approach can be used, for which
symbol sets are found using a Monte Carlo simulation. A
random set of BB symbols for each transmitter is randomly
generated and is normalized to meet the power constraint
in (4). The resulting joint constellation is derived and its
minimal Euclidean distance as defined in (3) is evaluated.
This process is repeated in numerous trials and the collection
of BB sets which result in the best joint constellation is
chosen. It is possible to add constraints on the BB symbol
sets sizes to comply with Quality of Service (QoS) demands.
In addition, the peak power constraints may vary across
transmitters to address unequal channel fading attenua-
tions which could represent near-far scenarios common
in multiple access scenarios. Preliminary results for such
optimization scenarios were presented in [37]. The solutions
found with the random symbol search are asymptotically
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Figure 3: Performance gain buildup using random symbol search.
A parametric symbol search approach can be used as
well. The phase and amplitude of each BB constellation
point is quantized with some resolution. The resulting joint
constellation is tested for each sample of phase and ampli-
tude. The granularity of the parametric search increases with
the quantization resolution, and the result is asymptotically
optimal for infinitely small granularity.
To explore the proposed approach the joint constellation
for N transmitters was optimized using a random symbol
search. For comparison, a TDMA system using a 2N -QAM
constellation is used, which results in the same overall bit
rate. Figure 3 displays the gain in dmin for the received
constellations. It is clearly seen that JCMA results in better
constellations for all tested N . This result shows that the
performance gain buildup proven before is achievable using
the random symbol search approach and that JCMA is
energy eﬃcient. An example of a joint constellation obtained
via random symbol search is given in Section 6.
5.2. Maximum Likelihood Detection. The received joint sig-
nal sample at the MF output is to be decoded based on
the expected joint constellation using ML detection. ML
detection in the presence of Gaussian noise boils down to
finding the constellation point which is closest to the received
sample (minimal Euclidean distance). Performing ML detec-
tion using exhaustive search over all possible constellation
points has algorithmic complexity of O(2N ). This complexity
grows exponentially with the number of transmitters. For
systems with constrained resources, exhaustive search might
be impractical to implement even for small values of N .
For example, N = 3 requires calculating and comparing
eight Euclidean distances for every received symbol. This
complexity problem exists for any single transmitter user
constellation with 2N constellation points. Traditionally, in
point-to-point systems the decoding complexity is reduced
by using suboptimal constellations such as rectangular QAM.
Suboptimal constellations are designed to exhibit structural
symmetries which are used for eﬃcient decoding of the
received samples [38].
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The JCMA constellation exhibits structural symmetries
as well. Using a simple manipulation on the expression for
the received joint symbol gives




sn; i = 1, . . . ,N. (28)





sn. If the symmetry lines are drawn for all
i = 1, . . . ,N symbol sets, the receiver’s observation space is
divided to decision regions with a constellation point at the
center of each region. The ML decoding problem in Gaussian
noise reduces to finding the decision region in which the
received sample is located.
Assuming the angles of the symmetry lines with the real
axis value in the complex plane are given by φi; i = 1, . . . ,N ,
the following guidelines for finding a computationally
eﬃcient ML decoding algorithm are defined.
(1) Rotate the received joint symbol sample r by an angle
of ϕ1: q = r exp(− jφ1).
(2) If qR = Re(q) is to the right of the symmetry line
intersection with the real axis, set Li = 1, else set Li
= 0.
(3) Repeat steps 1,2 for all i.
(4) Use Li; i = 1, . . . ,N to access a predefined Look
Up Table (LUT) containing the bit loading of the
constellation point in the decision region of the
received sample.
The algorithmic complexity of the suggested eﬃcient ML
decoding is O(N). This is also the complexity of traditional
2N -QAM ML decoding of a single transmitter with equal rate
to a JCMA system with N transmitters and 1 bit per symbol
per transmitter.
5.3. Eﬀects of Imperfect Power Control, Synchronization Errors
and Mobility. JCMA requires synchronization between the
transmitters at the symbol level. This is a higher synchroniza-
tion demand than that of TDMA, for example. Methods with
equivalent synchronization demands as those of JCMA are
symbol-synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)
[26, 41], SM-SD [25], and the methods defined in [28–32].
In addition, JCMA demands a higher accuracy in power
control. In this section, the eﬀects of synchronization errors,
power control errors, and mobility on JCMA are discussed.
For coherency of presentation, the rigorous analysis leading
to this discussion is given in Appendix A.
Lack of perfect synchronization is manifested by errors
in the channel phase estimates, and inaccurate power control
is manifested by errors in the channel amplitude estimate.
It follows that both are accurately modeled by an additive
complex RV representing an error in the channel estimate
(CSI errors). The eﬀects of CSI errors (phase and amplitude)
on system performance are analyzed in a comparative
manner to TDMA. Since the transmitters are required to be
simple in design, we assume that each transmitter obtains its
CSI by estimating the channel coeﬃcient using some linear
estimator, such as a linear Minimum Mean Square Error
(MMSE) estimator.
In Appendix A the required energy of the JCMA receiver
sent pilot signal is found with respect to that of a TDMA
system, so that the JCMA system performance loss would
be the same as the TDMA system performance loss. This
analysis results in a quantitative estimate of the eﬀects of
synchronization and power control errors, and the required
pilot energy to support the synchronization demands of
JCMA. In Appendix A it is shown that in order to achieve
the same synchronization/power control error in JCMA as
that of TDMA while maintaining the decoding gain, the
pilot energy used for channel estimation must have N times
more energy. This increase in energy can be achieved by
using longer pilots resulting in decreased throughput or by
increasing pilot signal power. Alternatively, the performance
gain can be waived by reducing the transmitters’ power
emission resulting in no need for increasing pilot energy.
In JCMA a pilot is sent every channel decorrelation time.
In Appendix A the rate of pilot transmission for JCMA is
calculated to achieve the same channel decorrelation as for
TDMA. This analysis results in a quantitative estimate of the
eﬀects of mobility of transmitters and the required system
resources to support such mobility (throughput loss due to
pilot signal transmission). It is also shown that the JCMA
system eﬀectively shortens the channel decorrelation time.
This results in a need for more frequent pilot transmission
which causes throughput reduction. As far as security is
concerned, the shortening of decorrelation time is a benefit.
This is because faster variation in the channel allows for
a higher cryptographic key generating rate. If the coding
gain is waived by reducing power emission, the decorrelation
time is the same for JCMA and TDMA and no overhead on
throughout is incurred.
Following the analysis in Appendix A we define the
following piloting rule: if the transmitters in a JCMA setting
use all their available power, decoding gain and faster key
generating rate are obtained at the expense of higher energy
consumption. To support these benefits without degrading
decoding the receiver’s pilot energy must be increased times
the number of transmitters. Alternatively, the decoding gain
and fast channel decorrelation can be waived by reducing
the transmitters’ power emission. This would result in same
energy consumption as that of a single transmitter and there
would be no need to increase pilot energy.
5.4. Network Management. JCMA is expected to operate in
a multiple access scenario. Multiple access scenarios require
network management protocols to resolve near-far problems,
facilitate QoS requirements, and optimize the overall data
throughput.
In the classical CDMA near-far scenario, a dominant
transmitter deprives other transmitters from service by
masking their transmitted signal at the receiver. The solution
is to use power-control by the receiver to reduce the power of
the dominant transmitter so that other transmitters can be
detected as well. In JCMA each transmitter adjusts its power
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emission according to channel fading and the symbol set it
is assigned by the receiver. The receiver can solve near-far
scenarios by assigning symbol sets which should be received
with low power to transmitters with higher attenuating
channels. Transmitters with lower attenuating channels can
be assigned a symbol set with higher power in the joint
constellation.
Another possible solution is to match transmitters into
JCMA groups according to the channel they experience over
diﬀerent subcarriers. This is an extension of OFDM-Access
(OFDMA). In OFDMA subcarriers are allocated to diﬀerent
transmitters according to the quality of their channel over the
frequency selective bandwidth. The basic idea is to allocate
parts of the bandwidth to each transmitter in an eﬃcient
way so that the overall network throughput is increased.
In JCMA transmitters should be grouped to facilitate the
construction of the joint signal constellation at the receiver
with minimal power-loss due to power reduction at the
dominant transmitters.
In addition, it is possible to perform oﬄine optimization
of symbol sets to resolve specific near-far scenarios. The
resulting symbol sets would be kept at the transmitters’
symbol sets tables and used when the receiver dims it
appropriate. This possibility does not exist in a classical
CDMA system.
Oﬄine optimization of symbol sets can be defined with
diﬀerent sizes of the transmitters’ symbols sets. A transmitter
with a larger symbol set size would be represented at the joint
constellation with more bits and so its throughout would be
higher than that of the other transmitters.
6. Illustrative Scenario—Rayleigh Fading
Performance in Rayleigh fading channels is evaluated in
what follows. First, the channel conditions for achieving
information theoretic security are depicted for various N in
accordance with the condition in (17). Following analysis
of information theoretic security, a JCMA setting of three
transmitters is depicted, including generating the joint
constellation and an algorithm for eﬃcient ML decoding.
The eﬀects of security factors 1, 3, and 4 described before are
evaluated and demonstrated as well. A scenario with three
transmitters was also used in the preliminary analysis given
in [40].
6.1. Information Theoretic Security. Recall that α in (17) has
to be set according to the temporal decorrelation behavior
of the channel. The normalized temporal autocorrelation
function for a Rayleigh fading channel is given by [33]
R(τ) = J0(2πBdτ), (29)
where J0(·) is the zero-order Bessel function of the first kind
and τ is the time diﬀerence. J0(2.4) ≈ 0 for the shortest
elapsed time. This is equivalent to setting τ = 2.4/2πBd in
(29), so it makes sense to set α = TdBd(2.4/2π) = 0.382.
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Figure 4: Minimal Doppler spread for security, Rayleigh fading;
N = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Figure 4 depicts the minimum Bd required for achiev-
ing information theoretic security for the entire channel
decorrelation period as a function of Bc for N = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
and η = 0.9, 0.99. The arrows directions indicate increasing
values of N . It is evident that increasing N lowers the
required Bd dramatically for a given Bc. The decrease is
moderated as N increases. For η = 0.9, the required Bd is
very high, making it diﬃcult to use the method for securing
the entire decorrelation period. However, for η = 0.99, the
required Bd is reasonably low for practical channels. For
example, consider the IEEE 802.16e standard (a.k.a. mobile
WiMax) [42]. In [42] the delay spread is assumed to be
10μs, which means that Bc = 100 kHz. For this value of
Bc, the Rayleigh fading channel achieves security for N =
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 when Bd ≥ 382 Hz, 191 Hz, 127 Hz, 96 Hz, 76 Hz,
respectively. Assuming a carrier frequency of fc = 3.5 GHz,
these values of Bd correspond to relative velocities between
transmitter and receiver of v ≥ 60, 30, 20, 15, 12 [km/h],
respectively. These velocities are expected for many mobile
scenarios.
6.2. Security by Complexity—Three Transmitters. In this
illustrative Rayleigh fading scenario, subcarriers are over-
loaded by 3 transmitters in a JCMA setting. The symbol sets
Sn,n = 1, 2, 3 were found using a random symbol search
with max{dmin} defined in (3) being the optimizing criterion
and (4) being the optimization constraint. The following

















(− j0.2016); 0.9890 exp( j2.9400)}.
(31)
The received joint constellation at the intended receiver
along with the corresponding bit mapping is depicted in
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Table 1: LUT for ML detection of the three transmitters scenario.
qI < −0.775 −0.775 ≤ qI < 0.775 0.775 ≤ qI
qR < −1.545 If (uI < 0.555) 010 else 011 011 If (uR < −0.555) 011 else 001
−1.545 ≤ qR < 0 010 111 001
0 ≤ qR < 1.545 110 000 101
























Figure 5: Joint constellation for the three transmitters scenario.
Figure 5. Each set of 3 bits represents the bits of TX1, TX2,
and TX3 from left to right, respectively. Notice that the
average energy of the received constellation is larger than 1.
Interestingly, this joint constellation has the exact structure
of a type of 8QAM constellation used in some industry
standards for a single transmitter signal [43, page 53]. Note
that the joint constellation is not Gray coded. Although this
increases BER, it would be shown below that performance is
satisfactory.
Next an eﬃcient ML decoding algorithm is designed,
based on constellation symmetries. The algorithm comprises
three steps for decoding a received joint sample r.
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Signal to noise ratio (Es/N0) (dB)
1 TX 8-QAM, exhaustive ML
3 TX JCMA, exhaustive ML
3 TX JCMA, eﬃcient ML
Eavesdropper, exhaustive ML
Figure 7: Performance curves for the three transmitters scenario.
For hard decoding, each table entry denotes the decoded
bits of TX1, TX2, and TX3 from left to right, respectively.
For soft decoding, the distance between q and the closest
































































Figure 8: Consecutive joint constellations of eavesdropper.
joint constellation point has to be evaluated. This eﬃcient
decoding algorithm consists of three easy steps and its com-
plexity is much lower than that of exhaustive ML decoding.
The JCMA setting is compared to a TDMA transmitter using
a power eﬃcient circular 8-QAM constellation with the same
power constraint. The 8-QAM constellation is depicted in
Figure 6.
In Figure 7, hard decoding BER versus SNR (defined
here as the ratio between the average energy per transmitter
symbol and the noise variance at the receiver) is depicted
for the JCMA setting and compared to TDMA. Results were
obtained using computer simulation. A gain of 4.4 dB is
achieved with JCMA while adhering to the transmitters’
power constraint. This means that the increased overall
energy invested in JCMA (3 times more than TDMA,
equivalent to 4.7 dB) was successfully translated to perfor-
mance gain. The marginal loss of 0.3 dB is attributed to the
lack of Gray coding. Note that the eﬃcient ML decoding
algorithm performs as well as the exhaustive ML decoding
algorithm.
To analyze the impact of security Factor 4 described in
Section 4.2, BER of the receiver is also compared to that
of an eavesdropper using a single MF and exhaustive ML
hard decoding. Both receiver and eavesdropper experience
a Rayleigh fading on all channels. It is clear that for
the eavesdropper ML decoding BER is unsatisfactory for
decoding the data. For example, if the receiver operates at
Es/N0 of 9 dB, it would experience a BER of 10−3, and the
eavesdropper would experience a BER of 10−1. It follows that
for the given scenario the eavesdropper cannot eﬀectively
decode the messages from the nodes, even when the unicity
distance has passed and security factors 1–3 described in
Section 4.2 are compromised.
The eavesdropper can reduce BER by applying soft
decoding instead of hard decoding and also apply multiple
antennas reception. However, to match the receivers hard
decoding BER of 10−3 the eavesdropper would need to
achieve an SNR gain of 20 dB, and at least some of the
gain achieved by the eavesdropper would be matched by
implementing low complexity soft decoding at the receiver.
It follows that the decoding complexity of the eavesdropper
must be high enough to obtain an SNR gain of at least 20 dB.
The SNR gain required at the eavesdropper for decoding is a
clear indication of security by complexity.
To gain insight on the impact of security factors 1
and 3 described in Section 4.2 on decoding, representative
joint constellations of the eavesdropper are depicted in
Figure 8. Note how the joint constellation varies from
pilot to pilot, implying the high decoding complexity. In
addition, note how close the constellation points are to
one another, implying the high probability for decoding
errors.
7. Conclusion
A multiple access method for securing OFDM over wireless
time-varying channels was proposed and analyzed. The
method uses reverse piloting for implementing superpo-
sition modulation with joint decoding at the receiver. It
makes use of channel randomness, reciprocity, and fast
decorrelation in space to secure transmission with low
overheads. Security strengths of the method were evaluated
and practical means of implementation were suggested
based on analytical analysis. Channel and system parameters
were explicitly derived for achieving information theoretic
security of entire transmission bursts, and features of security
by complexity were assessed and demonstrated. Means
for generating and eﬃciently decoding joint constellations
were presented. It was proven that in addition to security,
the method also oﬀers decoding gain for power-limited
transmitters. The eﬀects of imperfections due to mobility,
power control errors, and synchronization errors were
analyzed and practical means for addressing them were
given. It was proven and demonstrated that both security
strength and decoding gain increase with the number of
transmitters and that information theoretic security with
low overheads is achievable for mobile scenarios in practical
communication systems. Implementing the method requires
the same computational complexity as a standard point-to-
point communication system, and mitigating the eﬀects of
mobility, power control errors, and synchronization errors
reduces to a simple piloting rule. The low computational
complexity and feasibility of implementation make the
method a good solution for securing OFDM transmis-
sion in wireless systems where the complexity associated
with implementing traditional security algorithms is pro-
hibitive.
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Figure 9: Single transmitter in TDMA.
Appendix
A. Effects of Imperfections on Performance
A.1. Synchronization and Power Control Errors
TDMA reference system. The TDMA BB model for a single
transmitter (indexed i) with CSI errors and power control
is depicted in Figure 9, where E0 is the energy per symbol
needed at the receiver to achieve a certain performance level,
hi is the complex valued channel fading coeﬃcient, sTi is the
TDMA symbol, and εTi is the channel estimation error.
Since the transmitters are required to be simple in design,
we assume that a linear estimator is used at each transmitter
for estimating the channel coeﬃcient, such as a linear MMSE
estimator. For MMSE estimators, εTi is modeled as a complex
normal random variable with zero mean and arbitrary
variance [44–49], and εTi is uncorrelated with hi.
At RX, the channel is estimated and compensated
for phase by an erroneous estimate of the channel
(hi + εTi )
∗
/|hi + εTi |. The channel estimated at RX is fed back
to the transmitter for allowing the transmitter to compensate
for channel fading before performing power control. It is
assumed this is done without error. It follows that, 1/|hi +εTi |
represents the TX compensation for fading.
Power control is achieved by setting
√
E0 and compensat-









Since channel estimation has to be fairly accurate, the
pilot energy is such that high SNR is achieved for channel
estimation. It follows that εTi is expected to be much smaller
in magnitude than hi and so Pr(|hi|  |εi|) ≈ 1. Using this









1 + εTi /hi
)





















def= √E0sTi (εTi /hi) represents the synchroniza-














Figure 10: Single transmitter in JCMA.
JCMA System. The JCMA BB model for a single transmitter
with CSI errors and power control is depicted in Figure 10,
where sJi and ε
J
i are the JCMA transmitted symbol and
channel estimation error of transmitter i, respectively.
Here the channel is estimated at TX alone and is
compensated prior to transmission. In the same manner as


































The last estimation in (A.3) is given using a Taylor expansion
with |εJi |  |hi|. The synchronization error of a single
transmitter in JCMA zJ
def= √E0sJi (εJi /hi) has the same
statistics as that of TDMA.














































The estimation errors εJi ; i = 1, 2, . . . ,N are uncorrelated
and identically distributed. The same is true for the channels
hi and information symbols s
J










The channel is estimated at TX using a pilot signal
from RX. Channel estimation using pilot signaling is well
established in theory and practice [44–49], and an “eﬃcient
estimate” as defined in [50] is obtained. This means that the
Cramer Rao Bound (CRB) for the channel estimation error is
achievable.
It is assumed that all transmitters are able to compensate
for the channel fading |hi| with their limited peak power.
This means that |hi| is higher than some threshold value.
If |hi| falls beneath this threshold the transmitter fails
to compensate for it and the connection between this
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 15
transmitter and the receiver cannot be maintained. This
phenomenon occurs in all multiple access methods in fading
channels and is usually solved at a high level protocol. In
cellular telephony, for example, a failing transmitter roams
to a diﬀerent Base Station (BS) for service.
The CRB for eﬃcient ML estimation of a random







where Ep is the energy of the pilot symbol, and N0 is the
AWGN noise variance.
Using (A.6), it is possible to calculate the needed increase
in pilot energy for JCMA in order to achieve the same
synchronization/power control error as that of TDMA. For













































i ,hi; i = 1, . . . ,N are all uncorrelated and













Note that E(|1/hi|2) < ∞ because it is assumed that the
transmitter can compensate for fading, so |hi|2 is higher than
some threshold. According to the peak power constraint,
E(|sJi |
2
) = E(|sTi |2), and (A.10) reduces to
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Equation (A.12) reduces to the compact expression:
EJp = NETp . (A.13)
Equation (A.13) gives the required energy of the JCMA
pilot signal sent by the receiver to achieve the same degrada-
tion in decoding as for an equivalent TDMA system.
A.2. Mobility and Channel Decorrelation. Channel decorre-
lation manifests itself in a shift of the joint constellation
points from their original position. The probability for a
more significant shift increases as time passes from the
last channel estimation time (pilot transmission time). It
follows that channel decorrelation directly influences the
shift in constellation points over time. We evaluate this
influence by deriving the expected shift of a constellation
point over time. A closely related approach is used when
evaluating transmitter performance in the presence of linear
and nonlinear distortions using Error Vector Magnitude
(EVM) [51–53]. EVM is a well-founded parameter used to
characterize the quality of communication and is closely
related to BER [51–53].
An EVM-like approach is used here for JCMA. Dis-
regarding the additive noise and errors in the channel
estimate at the receiver, the received constellation points
of any communication system are supposed to remain
constant over time. However, as the channel decorrelates
the points shift randomly, due to a discrepancy between the
last channel estimate and the true value of the time-varying
channel.
The shift of a specific constellation point over time is a
stochastic process defined as
Δy0(t) = y0(t)− y0(t0), (A.14)
where t0 ≤ t is the last time the channel was estimated (a
pilot signal was sent) and y0(t0) ∈ y, where y denotes the
constellation set. For ease of notation the J index is dropped
from the following derivation. There is a one to one mapping


















In a classical EVM approach, the variance of
Δy0(t)/maxy0(t0)(|y0(t0)|2) should be averaged over all
points in the constellation. Because the focus of analysis
is performance degradation of a communication link due
to channel decorrelation, it would be biased in favor of
JCMA to normalize Δy0(t), since higher overall energy is
invested in the JCMA constellation. In the following analysis
the conditional variance of Δy0(t) is evaluated without
normalization and then averaged over all points in the



















y0(t) | x − y0(t0) | x
]
[y0(t) | x − y0(t0) | x]∗
})
= E
(∣∣(y0(t) | x)∣∣2) + E(∣∣(y0(t0) | x)∣∣2)
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def= E(hi(t)h∗i (t0)) is the channel autocorrelation
function and depends on the channel fading statistics. Notice
that since the in-phase and quadrature components of all
channels are uncorrelated, R(t) is a real function and,



















(∣∣∣xJi ∣∣∣2)(var(h)− R(t)) def= var(ΔyJ0(t)),
(A.23)
where the superscript J was reintroduced.
For TDMA this variance is given by
var
(









where xTi ≡ sTi hi(t0). Obviously, var(ΔyT0 (t)) < var (ΔyJ0(t))
and var(ΔyJ0(t)) increases with N . It is easy to show that if
normalization of Δy0(t)/|y0(t0)|2 was initially introduced to
(A.18), the result would have been the same for TDMA and
JCMA.
To compare decorrelation times (A.23) and (A.24)
should be equated. Let tJp and tTp be the time passed
between consecutive pilots in JCMA and TDMA respectfully.


















Now, using (A.23) and (A.24) in (A.25),
2




The solution to (A.26) depends on the channel fading
instance and the symbols being transmitted. Averaging over
all channel instances and symbol types on both sides of
(A.26) gives
2E
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However, E(|sTi |2) = E(|sJi |
2











+ var(h)(N − 1)
N
. (A.29)
The functions R(tJp) and R(tTp ) are monotonic decreasing
functions until full decorrelation is reached for the first time,




























Since R(0) > R(tTp ), μ > R(t
T
p ) which means that t
J
p < tTp . It
follows that JCMA eﬀectively shortens the decorrelation time
of the channel.
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